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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the role of environmental norms in Chinese overseas investment in 
hydropower dams, exemplified by Sinohydro’s involvement in the Bui Dam in Ghana. 
While the investment of Western companies in hydropower dams in the global South is 
decreasing owing to changing notions of sustainability in the West, the investment of 
Chinese companies in hydro dams in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America is 
accelerating at great speed. The emergence of Chinese companies in international markets 
in the context of China’s Going Abroad strategy has sparked a debate on whether China 
can be considered a norm-changer in international development. The paper considers this 
question in the context of the status of environmental norms in Sinohydro’s investment in 
Ghana’s Bui Dam. The paper argues that the role of international norms in Chinese 
investment is dependent on two factors: the contractual arrangements under which Chinese 
companies operate abroad, and the political institutions of host countries. 
 
Key words: hydropower, dams, environment, norms, Chinese overseas investment, South-
South Cooperation
2 
 
Chinese Hydropower Companies and Environmental Norms in Countries of the 
Global South: The Involvement of Sinohydro in Ghana’s Bui Dam 
 
Introduction 
Since the launch of the Going Abroad strategy, Chinese companies have been increasingly 
competing with established Western companies, buying assets previously held by them or 
gaining more international market shares (Goldstein 2007). Chinese infrastructure 
companies, for instance, have made significant inroads into the international market for 
large hydropower dams (McDonald et al. 2009). The reasons why Chinese companies, 
state-owned and private, venture abroad are manifold. Brautigam (2010) pointed out that 
the Chinese government encourages companies to invest abroad, particularly those that are 
energy and labour-intensive, for a number of reasons: companies in China are supposed to 
move up the value chain, pollution laws are getting tougher, and labour costs are rising, not 
only in the booming coastal provinces but, as The Economist (2012b) has recently 
reported, also in the rural hinterland. Therefore, it may become advantageous to move 
costly and polluting production to other countries where regulations are laxer and labour 
costs lower.  
 
Furthermore, growing competition within the Chinese market is prompting companies to 
go abroad to look for shares of international markets. Consequently, winning a project 
outside China is, from the company’s point of view, a strategic step in improving its 
revenue and international competitiveness, in opening up new markets, and in acquiring 
the latest technology and access to market information (Alden 2007; Gu 2009; Downs 
2000: 15-42; Leung 2011: 1335; Wang 2002: 203). Chinese companies are therefore 
looking for long-term engagements in foreign markets (Chen and Orr 2009: 1207-1209).  
 
As a consequence, as scholars such as Erica Downs (2006, 2009) and Shaofeng Chen 
(2011) have emphatically argued, even Chinese state-owned companies operate like other 
firms on a commercial basis and with a great degree of independence from the Chinese 
government. As Hong and Sun (2006, 615-616) point out, China’s foreign investment is 
now commercial rather than political, it is enterprise-led, and it covers a ‘range of 
objectives including market seeking, technology seeking, risk diversification and other 
objectives common to MNCs worldwide’. This view is mirrored by Mawdsley (2007: 406-
407) who emphasizes that Chinese companies abroad act in very different environments, 
not only as regards the nature of their business (import-export, manufacturing, resource 
extraction), but also in terms the political environment they work in: while some may 
profit from authoritarian governments, others profit from transparent environments. Thus, 
in their pragmatic orientation they are very similar to Western companies.  
 
The present article evaluates the role of international standards in Sinohydro Bureau 8’s 
(henceforth: Sinohydro) engagement in the Bui Dam in Ghana. The reason for choosing 
Bui is that the at the time Sinohydro became involved, the dam had a history of roughly 50 
years in which several attempts at planning were taken, but none matured to construction. 
This was due to several changes in government preferences and policies, civil conflict, and 
– since the 1990s – a lack of interest among Western governments to finance the dam 
owing to changes in the sustainability discourse in the advanced industrialized countries. It 
is this changing sustainability discourse that makes Sinohydro’s involvement in the Bui 
Dam interesting as it allows investigating questions in relation to the environmental effects 
of Chinese companies and whether or not their involvement is per se detrimental to the 
environment. 
 
The present article analyzes the involvement of Sinohydro in planning and building the 
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dam and examines the environmental effects that can be directly linked to the activities of 
the company. Following the focus of this Special Issue on the environmental effects of 
Chinese foreign investment, the article concentrates on the environmental impact 
assessment process rather than on resettlement and wider social issues that surround the 
debate of large dams. It therefore focuses on the planning phase rather than the 
construction phase. The narrow focus will shed light on the precise responsibilities of 
Sinohydro vis-à-vis Ghanaian actors in the field of environmental protection in project 
planning (and implementation), and on the type of norms – international, Ghanaian, or 
Chinese – the company has to comply with. 
 
The government-backed economic emergence of Chinese companies in the international 
market place has sparked analyses of the future trajectory of international development. 
The roles of economic governance institutions of the G8 and the G20 have been intensely 
discussed in the context of whether or not China can be considered a rule-changer in 
international politics (Chin 2008; Chin and Thakur 2010; Subacchi 2008; Payne 2008). 
Some even argue for the existence of a Beijing Consensus whereby China is leading the 
way in the advocacy of localism in economic policy-making (Ramo 2004). In a more 
moderate twist of Ramo’s argument, Grugel et al. (2008) identify the search of Latin 
America and Asia for more autonomy in development after the Latin American debt crisis 
and the Asian Financial Crisis. Others see the emerging economies as a new creed of state 
capitalist countries that refuse to comply with the prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus (The Economist 2012a). 
 
The Chinese government certainly has different concepts and practices of development. 
The ‘Angola model’ of backing infrastructure deals with natural resources, the mixed-
package financing mode of commercial and concessional loans, and the no-strings policy 
regarding political and economic governance are in sharp contrast to the practice of the 
countries of the developed North (Davies 2008; Rotberg 2008; Grimm et al. 2011). In 
response to this, some authors argue that economic development is based on transparency 
and good governance, including the observance of social and environmental standards and 
that therefore the Chinese approach does not provide an alternative path to development 
(van Dijk 2010; Naím 2007).1 Others have argued that the Chinese approach holds 
advantages to the Western approach (Sautman and Yan 2007; Li 2007). Again others 
caution both sides and argue that the Chinese approach to development is effective under 
certain conditions or at least needs to be evaluated by looking at actual projects on the 
ground (Woods 2008; Haglund 2008; Brautigam 2009, 2010; Zafar 2007).  
 
Yet, in regards to the question of whether China is intent to change international norms, the 
issue of Chinese government involvement in foreign investment via subsidized loans and 
diplomatic support has to be treated with care. Whether or not a Chinese company receives 
preferential loans from Chinese banks and/or diplomatic support from the Chinese 
government says little about the nature of its involvement in projects abroad. The present 
article argues that the contractual setting in which Chinese companies operate and the 
governance setting of the host country are key factors in determining whether or not strict 
environmental protection measures are implemented in projects with Chinese involvement 
and whether Chinese firms apply international norms, the norms of the host country, or 
Chinese norms.  
 
While the debate about the conceptual and practical differences of development between 
                                            
1 For a slightly different line of argument concerning a race to the bottom in labour standards between 
developing countries see Chan and Ross (2003).  
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the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and China is well documented, little is known about the detailed involvement of Chinese 
infrastructure companies in project planning and implementation.  
 
In a first step, the article sets the scene by looking at the role of the emerging countries in 
international development and the relevance of international norms. Next, it evaluates 
Sinohydro’s role in planning and building the Bui Dam, with a focus on the environmental 
impact assessment process. Following this, the article looks at the wider implications of the 
Bui loan agreements for Ghana’s economic development.  
 
Data comes from field work conducted in Ghana during a two-week field stay in June 2010. 
Field work consisted of collection of relevant literature and of interviews with Ghanaian 
government institutions (the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; the Ministry of 
Energy; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Energy Commission; and the Water 
Resources Commission), researchers, OECD donor agencies and civil society 
organizations. Interviewees were assured anonymity. The interviews are therefore coded, 
with the first letter indicating the place of interview in Ghana and the number sequence the 
date of the interview.  
 
South-South Cooperation reloaded? The overseas investment of Chinese companies 
and the question of international norms 
At a keynote speech at the Development Cooperation Forum at the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York in June 2010, Yi Xiaozhun, China’s vice minister of commerce 
emphasized that China supported South-South Cooperation as a means to support the 
development of Third World countries. Outlining the Chinese view, he pointed out that 
developing countries are overly reliant on development aid and that a mix of approaches, 
including ‘trade, investment, technology transfer, [and] capacity building’ should be 
incorporated into development policies. Moreover, emphasizing localism over the liberal 
one-size-fits-all policies of the World Bank, Yi argued that developing countries should 
‘identify the policies and solutions most responsive to their own needs’. A precondition for 
this is ‘non-politically conditioned assistance’ (Xinhua 2010).  
 
The prominent role of China, along with the economic rise of Brazil, India and South 
Africa, has arguably given a new boost to South-South Cooperation (Melville and Owen 
2005). Having occurred hitherto between rather powerless and heterogeneous developing 
countries, South-South Cooperation now has proponents with global influence (Shaw et al. 
2007). This is most visible in the formation of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
group of countries on their summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009. BRIC was expanded to 
BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa in December 2010 and the attendance of Jacob 
Zuma at the 2011 BRIC summit in Hainan. The BRICS group’s announcement of its 
intention to set up a development bank that would take away the dominance of the World 
Bank in international development (BBC 2012) is particularly indicative of the increasing 
impatience emerging economies exhibit with regard to stalling reforms of the power 
distribution in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As Alden and 
Vieira (2005: 1079-1080) make clear, the emergence of new powers results in ‘normative 
calls for restructuring international institutions to reflect greater global representivity’ 
which undermines the position of the classic middle powers and the principles that they 
support (ibid.: 1079-1080).2 
                                            
2 See Alden and Vieira (2005: 1078-1080) for their distinction between classic and new middle powers. For 
conceptual debates on the shifts in global power distribution see Young (2010), Ikenberry and Wright (2008), 
Alexandroff and Cooper (2010).  
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Other parts of the traditional global governance system are already changing. The G20, 
which includes the BRICS along with other emerging economies such as Argentina and 
Mexico, was formed at the G7 Finance Ministers’ meeting in 1999. Since the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the Asian-led economic recovery of the world economy the G20 has 
replaced the G8 ‘as the world’s premier forum for economic cooperation’ (Asian 
Development Bank and Peterson Institute for International Economics 2011: v; Hart and 
Jones 2011: 63). Writing in Survival, Hart and Jones (2011: 63) argue that the fact that this 
shift from the G8 to the G20 went swift and peaceful is an indicator of ‘clear Western 
acceptance of the global role of the rising powers.’ 
 
China, therefore, is not alone in challenging Western dominance in international 
development. Furthermore, developing countries have now found that they can use 
Chinese aid as bargaining chip when negotiating loans and grants with Western countries. 
As recently emphasized by Cambodia’s charismatic Prime Minister Hun Sen, when 
developing countries cannot get money from Western institutions such as the World Bank, 
they can still get money from China (IRIN 2012).  
 
As the emerging powers have not only greatly reduced or shed entirely their dependence 
on developing aid, they have themselves become lenders to less developed countries, thus 
dramatically reducing the influence of the developed North. Added to this is a keen 
economic interest of the emerging economies in developing countries. As Woods (2008: 
1205) summarized: 
 
Common to most of these [new] donors is a quest for energy security, enlarged 
trading opportunities and new economic partnerships, coupled with rapidly 
growing strength and size in the global economy. 
 
This holds true for the interest of the Chinese government and Chinese companies in 
Africa, given the domestic demand for raw materials, export, and investment (Mawdsley 
2007). Mohan and Power (2009: 2) argue that in contrast to Western countries China does 
not view Africa as a lost cause but ‘as a region of profitable economic possibilities.’3  
 
With Western companies and multilateral development banks being subjected to intense 
scrutiny by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public and the media 
against the backdrop of changing notions of sustainability (Park 2010; Suzuki 2007), 
Chinese companies have gained ground in the energy and infrastructure markets of 
developing and emerging economies in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
Hydropower is an important sector here, not only for Chinese infrastructure companies, but 
also for developing countries who see hydropower as a cost-effective and clean way to 
build up their energy basis (Nelson 2003-2004; Timilsina et al. 2010).  
 
This raises the question of the environmental sustainability of dams. In the advanced 
industrialized countries, no large dams are built anymore and existing ones are often 
decommissioned. This is because the sustainability discourse has taken on a decidedly anti-
dam form, fuelled by prominent social and environmental disasters such as Pak Mun in 
Thailand and the Narmada controversy in India (Khagram 2004; Wood 2007). In the wake 
of the Narmada conflict, the World Commission on Dams was formed, and pressured by 
global media and civil society, global governance institutions – most prominently the 
World Bank – slowly overhauled their environmental policies (Park 2010) before re-
                                            
3 Of course, there is also a clear strategic-political interest. For details see Taylor (1998), Ding (2008). 
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engaging in financing large dams again. In addition, while dams are seen by many to be a 
form of clean energy as they do not emit CO2, hydropower has been lambasted as having 
an even worse greenhouse gas effect as they emit methane (Frey and Linke 2002; Giles 
2006).  
 
In contrast to this development in the sustainability debate, emerging and developing 
countries are experiencing of a boom in large dam construction, fuelled by companies from 
emerging economies, particularly China. Indeed, the World Bank (2009) emphasized that 
dam-building, particularly multi-purpose dam-building for power, navigation, irrigation 
and flood protection, is on the rise in emerging and developing countries. A dam database 
of Chinese-built dams overseas maintained by International Rivers and last updated in 
January 2012 lists a total of 59 Chinese hydropower or multipurpose dam projects in 
Africa, 48 of them large (International Rivers 2012). This raises the question of how 
relevant international environmental norms are in Chinese hydropower investment.   
 
In addition, it raises the question of whether or not dams should be discussed as 
international development projects. Although the Bui Dam is at least partially funded 
through a commercial loan and falls within the remit of China’s Going Abroad strategy, it 
is nevertheless analyzed here as a project within the area of international development. 
There are three reasons for this: first, the purpose of the dam is to serve electrification in a 
developing country that is suffering from energy shortfalls. Second, it is funded by two 
loans extended by the China Export Import Bank (China Exim Bank), of which only one is 
straightforwardly commercial whereas the other is concessional. Third, commercially-
driven companies are increasingly involved in international development, thus moving 
away from the narrow focus of development as an exclusive government domain (Baillie 
Smith and Laurie 2011). Not only is such narrow definition of aid refuted by the Chinese 
government, but Western companies are becoming increasingly involved in the business of 
development.  
 
As a consequence, China’s increasing role in building up international energy 
infrastructure gives it an important role in what Morais de Sa e Silva (2010) has termed a 
‘revamped South-South Cooperation’. Alden and Vieira (2005) and others have pointed 
out that while until the 1990s, South-South Cooperation was bedevilled by a diverse as 
well as politically and economically weak developing South (Saksena 1985; Sridharan 
1998), the economic recovery of Latin American countries from the 1980s debt crisis and 
the IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes as well as the emergence of the 
group of BRICS has given the global South a strong voice in international affairs (Alden et 
al. 2010; Dirlik 2007; Alden and Vieira 2005). 
 
It can therefore be argued that the ‘revamped’ (Morais de Sa e Silva 2010: 3) South-South 
Cooperation goes hand in hand with a shift in global power relations. Yet, as Vieira and 
Alden (2011) emphasize, this does not mean that the leadership role of these emerging 
powers is generally accepted by developing countries, particularly by those in the 
respective regions of South America, Southern Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, or 
that emerging economies are not in competition with each other over access to markets. 
However, cooperation between emerging powers expresses the ‘common understanding 
that together they can better contribute to the reshaping of global governance mechanisms 
in a number of sensitive issues in contemporary global politics’ (p. 509).  
 
Yet, this does not say much about what sort of norms Chinese companies apply in their 
foreign investment. Rather than replacing Western norms with other norms, it may well be 
that the participation of Chinese companies in the international market place leads to their 
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acceptance of international norms should it be conducive to their investment activities. 
Brown (2008: 7-8) pointed out that many Chinese companies are still adapting to foreign 
investment environments as Chinese foreign investment was almost non-existent before the 
beginning of the economic reforms in 1978/79. But changes are afoot. Gugler and Shi 
(2009) argue that Chinese companies have begun to adopt corporate social responsibility 
policies, not so much in compliance with Western standards but in order to pro-actively 
improve their competitive position in international trade.4 Even financiers are taking an 
interest in international norms as Chinese banks have been urged to adopt international 
standards, particularly the Equator Principles, ‘in order to avoid a “race to the bottom” 
between banks’ (Matisoff and Chan 2008: 34). While China Exim Bank has not adopted 
the Equator Principles, it published its first environmental guidelines in 2004 and updated 
and expanded them in 2007 (China Exim Bank 2007). China Exim Bank also went on the 
offensive by meeting with International Rivers director Peter Bosshard and American 
scholar Deborah Brautigam and told them that it was working with Western institutions to 
improve its environmental assessment procedures (Bosshard 2010a).  
 
Developments such as these indicate that the picture of the role of international norms in 
Chinese foreign investment is complex. Surveying forty-four Chinese construction 
companies operating in Africa, Chen, Goldstein and Orr (2009: 80) found that 40 percent 
won contracts through international bidding, 40 percent through bidding for Chinese 
contracts, and 11 percent through sole source negotiation. As the authors clarify, the nature 
of the contract is one factor that influences the norms Chinese companies use: feasibility 
studies, environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments drawn up by 
international lending agencies such as the World Bank include the norms and standards of 
these agencies. Chinese companies contracted to execute such studies are normally 
compelled to abide by the norms referenced in the documents. Of the companies surveyed, 
seventeen applied international standards as required by the financier, fifteen applied host 
country standards, nine applied Chinese standards, and three could choose the standards 
they applied (p. 86).   
 
Environmental impact assessment for the Bui Dam: who is involved and what norms 
are applied? 
The Bui Dam is an example of sole source negotiation of Chinese agencies with the 
government of Ghana. After several failed attempts during the previous decades to build 
the Bui Dam5, in 2005 the Ghanaian government accepted an ‘unsolicited bid’ from 
Sinohydro to finance and construct the Bui Dam (World Bank 2008: 108). The acceptance 
of Sinohydro’s bid was followed in the same year by a Memorandum of Understanding 
between Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and Sinohydro, with funding to be solicited from 
China Exim Bank (Fink 2005: 71). The Chinese government made its support public by 
announcing at the 2006 summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing that 
it would fund the project. The government of Ghana signed the loan agreements with 
China Exim Bank in 2008. 
 
However, despite the lack of an international bidding process, the Chinese project 
company, Sinohydro, is bound by international standards. The reason for this is rooted in 
two developments: first, the Ghanaian government commissioned European companies to 
draw up the feasibility study and the environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) 
study. Second, Ghana’s environmental laws not only consistently refer to international 
                                            
4 For a summary of the debate on the concept of corporate social responsibility and its links to development 
see Prieto-Carrón et al. (2006), Jenkins (2005), Blowfield and Frynas (2005).  
5 For a history of the Bui project before the Chinese engagement see Fink (2005).  
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norms, but they are also reasonably well implemented. This also holds true for the 
procedures leading to the loan agreement with China Exim Bank, as Ghanaian law 
stipulates that loan agreements can only be signed after ESIAs have been conducted. The 
following analysis will examine these two factors in detail.  
 
The role of European companies in planning the Bui Dam 
Chen, Goldstein and Orr (2009) found that in some of the projects in Africa that see 
Chinese involvement, Chinese companies have to implement projects that were planned by 
European companies that use international norms. This holds true for the Bui Dam. The 
first feasibility study for Bui was conducted in 1976 by Australia’s Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation. It was updated in 1995 by French company Coyne et Bellier. 
Since then, the Ghanaian government has held on to Coyne et Bellier. In 2006, following 
the Chinese engagement, the government asked the French firm to update its 1995 study 
(Fink 2005). Coyne et Bellier continue to function as consultants to Sinohydro during the 
construction phase (Zigah 2009: 26).  
 
A similar development can be observed for the ESIA process. In 2005, two months after 
the Ministry of Energy and Sinohydro concluded the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
Ministry of Energy signed a contract with UK firm Environmental Resources Management 
to draw up the ESIA study. Environmental Resources Management delivered its report in 
January 2007 (Environmental Resources Management 2007a). In February 2007, the 
Environmental Protection Agency approved the ESIA study. It was only then, in April 
2007, that the Ministry of Energy and Sinohydro signed the Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction (EPC) turnkey contract. In July 2007, Ghana’s parliament approved the 
financing package of US$662 million. In 2008, Ghana’s Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning and China Exim Bank signed the loan agreement.  
 
As a consequence, all key planning documents were drawn up not by Chinese companies, 
but by European companies. Furthermore, the loan agreements were approved and signed 
following the completion of the environmental approval process. In the planning and 
construction for Bui, the project company Sinohydro is therefore bound by the norms 
referred to in the planning documents – at least in theory and to the extent that the 
Ghanaian government is interested in implementing them. Essentially, what has therefore 
occurred is that Sinohydro was contracted to build the dam based on a set of planning 
documents commissioned and paid for by Ghanaian government agencies and written by 
European consulting agencies.  
 
Norms and implementation of the environmental approval process and the loan procedures 
While Sinohydro is the construction company tasked to build the dam, the Bui Power 
Authority is the project owner. Formally created under the Ministry of Energy, the Bui 
Power Authority as project owner is obliged to apply for all necessary permits to the 
relevant Ghanaian government agencies. In order to obtain the environment permit, the Bui 
Power Authority had to apply to the Environmental Protection Agency that is also in 
charge of approving the ESIA study that was drawn up by the UK’s Environmental 
Resources Management. The Environmental Protection Agency also monitors the 
implementation of the ESIA study (Government of Ghana 1999; interviews A21062010-3 
and A14072010).   
 
The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1994 through the Environmental 
Protection Agency Act. This was preceded by a number of environmental disasters, 
specifically pollution of rivers by gold mining operations in the Ashanti region, and armed 
threats by villagers in the Western region to take action against mining companies in their 
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village (Ofori 1991; Graham 1993). Following its establishment, the Environmental 
Protection Agency was tasked to develop an environmental impact assessment regime. 
This resulted in the 1999 Environmental Assessment Regulations, which defines two types 
of projects: those without the need to undergo ESIA, and those that have to undergo one in 
order to obtain the environment permit (Government of Ghana 1999). Projects subject to a 
mandatory impact assessment include ‘power generation’ projects, and specifically ‘dams 
and hydroelectric power schemes’ (Government of Ghana 1999). Furthermore, the 
environment permit must be granted before a loan agreement can be signed (interview 
A21062010-3)  
 
It is noteworthy that this mirrors China Exim Bank’s Guidelines for Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessments of the China Export and Import Bank’s Loan Projects of 
August 2007. Articles 12 and 13 lay down the regulations for environmental impact 
assessments in foreign projects. They specify that ESIA documents need to be drawn up 
before the loan agreement can be signed. They further say that the environmental laws of 
host countries form the basis of Exim Bank’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of a 
project. However, when the host country lacks adequate environmental regulations, 
Chinese or international standards can be used. Article 12(4) also emphasizes the need for 
public consultation for projects with serious negative impacts, although what ‘serious’ 
constitutes is not further specified. Before the loan agreement can be signed, the borrower 
is required to submit to the Exim Bank the ESIA documents as well as the environmental 
approval documents. They therefore become part of the loan application (China Exim 
Bank 2007). Indeed, according to a government official, the Exim Bank requested a full 
ESIA report, which was followed by new rounds of loan negotiations (interview 
A30062010-1). Staff at the Environmental Protection Agency pointed out that the Agency 
required the loan agreements to refer to World Bank guidelines regarding dam safety, 
resettlement and forestry, to which Exim Bank agreed (interview A21062010-3). 
 
Following these requirements, the Bui Power Authority applied for the environment permit 
to the Environmental Protection Agency. Subsequent to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s approval of the ESIA, the Agency issued the environment permit to the Bui 
Power Authority. While this occurred during the loan negotiations with China Exim Bank, 
the loan agreements were signed after the environment permit had been issued (interview 
A14072010). In the case of Bui, therefore, China Exim Bank can be said to have followed 
its regulations, at least as regards the formal process. The Bui Power Authority refused to 
comment on the quality of China Exim Bank’s review process and only mentioned that the 
ESIA study and the environment permit were submitted to China Exim Bank by Ghana’s 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (interview A28062010-2). It is therefore also 
unclear to what extent Exim Bank scrutinized the implementation of its Article 12(4) on 
public consultation.  
 
It is important to note that the environment permit forms the most basic of all permits that 
are required for project approval by Ghanaian government agencies. It is necessary so that 
the Bui Power Authority can apply for all other permits: the diversion permit, construction 
permit and water use permit, all of which are issued by the Water Resources Commission; 
and finally the licenses for the operation of energy facilities, which are issued by the 
Energy Commission. Only then can construction begin (interviews A23062010-3 and 
A29062010).  
 
Regarding norms and standards, Environmental Resources Management made extensive 
reference to both World Bank and Ghanaian norms by laying out in detail the stipulations 
of Ghana’s 1999 Environmental Assessment Regulations, the World Bank Safeguard 
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Policies for Environmental Assessment contained in Operational Policy 4.01, and the 
World Bank Environmental Assessment Sourcebook (Environmental Resources 
Management 2007a: i, 4, 149-150). Following Ghanaian and World Bank requirements, 
the ESIA study presented comprehensive baseline data in the project area on social 
conditions, natural resources, cultural and economic factors, the land tenure situation, a 
detailed project description with an assessment of alternatives, the impact on downstream 
communities and on Bui National Park, a plan for mitigating and monitoring 
environmental impacts, a provisional environmental management plan, and a 
decommissioning proposal. Perhaps most importantly of all, the study detailed the levels of 
public consultation, who was consulted and how, and to what extent the public’s comments 
were incorporated in the study. Public consultations were organized by the Bui 
Development Committee (the predecessor of the Bui Power Authority) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency and its local offices (Environmental Resources 
Management 2007a). 
 
This is the most controversial part of the ESIA study. While providing detailed 
descriptions of the consultations and the participants, NGOs criticized the report for the 
fact that no public consultations were held in the project area, but only in Ghana’s capital 
Accra and in larger towns outside the project area where it is difficult for people from the 
project area to travel (interviews A22062010-1, A22062010-2). Furthermore, unaffected 
people from neighbouring villages outside the project area were allowed to comment, 
leading to concerns that the opinions of affected people might be side-lined (interviews 
A22062010-1, A22062010-2). In addition, the results of the public hearings are not legally 
binding. Yet, the national-level hearings were attended by an important cross-section of 
social groups: representatives of Sinohydro, government agencies, local chapters of 
international NGOs, academia and the media (Environmental Resources Management 
2007b: Annex N).  
 
Following the completion of the ESIA study in January 2007, the Environmental 
Protection Agency organized a technical review panel and announced publication of the 
report for twenty-one working days in public libraries, national newspapers, and local 
government offices in the affected districts. Following this, public and technical comments 
were sent to the Bui Power Authority with the request to have Environmental Resources 
Management revise the ESIA with regard to the following aspects (interview A21062010-
3, Environmental Resources Management 2007a: 149-150, interview A21062010-3, 
interview A21062010-3): to advise on compensation for the flooding of 21 percent of Bui 
National Park, to detail a management plan for the Park and for the rescuing of the 
hippopotamus population, to detail resettlement requirements, and to assess the impact on 
the Akosombo Dam located downstream (interview A21062010-3). Indeed, it is arguably 
these two factors – the flooding of a substantial part of the part and the difficulties of 
finding another habitat for the hippos – that led the government of Ghana to look for 
construction firms outside the developed North where the sustainability discourse and an 
alert media and civil society would have put governments and companies under 
considerable pressure had they agreed to finance and build Bui. 
 
Following this, Environmental Resources Management made amendments accordingly and 
sent the report back – through the Bui Power Authority – to the Environmental Protection 
Agency. The Agency subsequently approved the report and issued the environment permit 
to the Bui Power Authority, based on the anticipated environmental impacts during and 
after construction. However, the Agency attached a number of conditions to the permit, 
including: the submission of a reporting schedule for water quality and resettlement, the 
submission of annual environmental reports, the presentation of an environmental 
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management plan within eighteen months of the issuance of the environment permit (the 
management plan has to be updated every three years), the reporting of changes to 
construction, flow regime etc., the beginning of construction within eighteen months of the 
issuance of the environment permit, and the obtaining of an environmental certificate that 
replaces the environment permit and in contrast to the permit is not based on anticipated 
impact but on actual performance. The environmental certificate is subject to renewal 
(interview A21062010-3). Compliance is monitored by the regional offices of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (interview A21062010-3).  
 
In terms of the environmental impact assessment, Sinohydro is affected by these processes 
to the extent that is has to comply with the conditions that the Environmental Protection 
Agency attached to the environment permit.6 However, since Sinohydro is tasked with 
construction only, it is not involved in holding public consultations (which was done by 
representatives of the Bui Development Committee) or implementing resettlement work. 
Indeed, as regards the environment7, the EPC turnkey contract gives Sinohydro a limited 
and very narrow mandate related to the technical aspects of construction (Sinohydro 
Bureau 8 2009), while the environmental planning arrangements are entirely the 
responsibility of the government agencies. Yet, Sinoydro is bound by the norms contained 
in the ESIA as approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. As permit holder, the 
Bui Power Authority is responsible for ensuring that Sinohydro complies with the 
conditions.   
 
Staff at the Environmental Protection Agency said that Sinohydro and the Bui Power 
Authority appear to adhere to the conditions. Similar statements were made by the Water 
Resources Commission, although staff there argued that construction of the dam was a 
political decision and could not have been prevented by either the Environmental 
Protection Agency or the Water Resources Commission. Indeed, the government pushed 
ahead with planning and construction of the dam despite concerns about the hippopotamus 
population and the fact that more than one-fifth of Bui National Park will be destroyed. 
The political pressure therefore left the environmental authorities only with the option to 
attach conditions to the environment permit and to monitor adherence as closely as 
possible (interviews A23062010-3 and A29062010).  
 
Yet, there are wider implications of Bui for Ghana’s economic development. Apart from 
the benefits of electricity generation, Ghanaian authorities hoped to boost their cocoa 
exports to China. Indeed, chocolate consumption in China is increasing particularly at the 
higher end of the market (Shanghai Daily 2008), and Ghanaian cocoa is a major export 
good and therefore source of revenue for the government in Accra (interview A30062010-
1). Cocoa exports are tied to the financing arrangement for Bui, which consists of three 
lines of credits: a buyer’s credit and a concessional loan provided by China Exim Bank, 
and a loan provided by the government of Ghana. The two credits provided by Exim Bank 
are the typical package-financing modalities that consist of a commercial and a 
concessional portion. Together, all three credits amount to US$622 million, to which the 
Ghanaian government loan contributes US$60. Exim Bank’s buyer’s credit is US$292 
million, with an interest rate of 2 percent over Commercial Interest Reference Rates, with 
an amortisation period of twenty years and a grace period of five years. The concessional 
loan amounts to US$270 million, with an interest rate of 2 percent, with an amortisation 
                                            
6 Sinohydro also has to comply with the conditions that the Water Resources Commission attaches to its 
permits.  
7 Health and safety issues are important for the relationship between workers and Sinohydro but shall not be 
discussed at this point given the focus of the paper on the environment.  
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period of twenty years, and a grace period of five years (interview at the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, June 2010). Both facilities are of international standard.  
 
To ensure repayment, Ghana’s government agreed to secure the Exim Bank loans with 
cocoa (interview A30062010-1). Again, after the mixed-package financing, this is another 
feature of Chinese project financing: to secure loans with natural resources. The Chinese 
government commits to purchase an annual amount of 30,000 tonnes of cocoa at going 
world market prices until the dam is operational. The revenues go into an escrow account 
held by Exim Bank from which the interest is paid (during construction, only the interest 
but not the principal of the loan needs to be serviced). Excess funds in the escrow account 
revert to the government coffers. The cocoa agreement expires five years after the dam is 
operational, which is when the grace period expires. After that, revenues from electricity 
sales will be used to repay the interest and the principal. However, 85 percent of energy 
sales revenues will again be placed into an escrow account with China Exim Bank, with 
the excess reverting to the government of Ghana when the funds are fully repaid (interview 
A30062010-1). In an analysis of the loan arrangements, the World Bank (2008: 6) 
commented that they are consistent with the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II and that 
there is only a ‘moderate risk of debt distress, albeit on the low side’.  
 
Indeed, it appears that the Ghanaian government was aware of potential negative 
implications of the loan agreement on its debt situation. Before signing the loan 
agreements with Exim Bank, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning conducted a 
cost-revenue projection based on the sale of power at 4.5 US cents per kWh and a 
generation capacity of 400MW. Since the calculation, energy prices have risen. An 
interviewee involved in the cost calculation maintained that the Bui project, when 
operational, ‘can pay for itself’ even at the originally calculated rate and ‘therefore will not 
impact debt sustainability’ (interview A30062010-2). 
 
Conclusion 
The paper had two core concerns: to investigate the relevance of the contractual conditions 
under which Sinohydro builds the Bui Dam, and to examine the relevance of domestic 
institutions in project planning and implementation.  
 
The engagement of Sinohydro in Ghana is firmly embedded in China’s Going Abroad 
policy. The Ghanaian government awarded Sinohydro the contract without an international 
bidding contest but following an offer submitted by Sinohydro to the government. Funding 
came from China Exim Bank. Funded as a mixed package (part concessional, part 
commercial), and backed by the export of cocoa beans, the Bui Dam financing structure 
also falls squarely within the Chinese development practice. For the company, Bui is a way 
to enhance its international visibility and its reputation as a company that can master 
complex engineering feats. 
 
Despite all this, Sinohydro is bound by international norms. The Ghanaian government 
contracted the Chinese firm to execute pre-existing planning documents. In addition, the 
contract under which Sinohydro operates is a turnkey contract, meaning that Sinohydro 
builds the dam, but it does not operate it. After construction, the company hands the project 
over to the Bui Power Authority for operation.  
 
It is therefore a situation in which Sinohydro is tied into a dense network of government 
planning procedures that appear to be largely adhered to. In other countries, Sinohydro 
along with other infrastructure companies may operate under very different conditions. In 
Cambodia, for instance, Sinohydro Bureau 8 builds the Kamchay Dam as a build-operate-
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transfer (BOT) project. This means that the company not only builds the dam but also 
operates it as a concession for forty years before handing the project over to the 
Cambodian government. As a consequence, the incentive structure for constructing the 
dam is very different as the company will profit from selling the energy to the Cambodian 
utility Electricite du Cambodge. In addition, Cambodia’s environmental impact assessment 
regime functions very differently as it is the duty of the project companies to commission 
and pay for the environmental impact assessment studies. Government oversight is scant, 
and the incentive structure for the company to commission the environmental impact 
assessment study is often to keep costs low and comply with government regulations in 
form rather than in spirit (Hensengerth forthcoming; Grimsditch 2012; Middleton 2008; 
McCallum 2008). 
 
The question of what norms apply therefore depends to a large degree on the precise 
contractual stipulations that determine the nature and scope of the involvement of the 
company during planning and implementation. It also depends on the domestic governance 
of host countries. Despite the political pressure exerted of Ghana’s environmental 
bureaucracy, the country presents a comparatively positive example of how 
environmentally precarious investments might be steered into a better direction by an alert 
environmental bureaucracy (although Bui is still being constructed and the final 
environmental impact needs to be awaited). The case of the Bui Dam shows that 
international norms are by no means irrelevant in Chinese foreign investment projects. 
Furthermore, the fact that China Exim Bank has adopted an environmental policy and that, 
according to a Western representative of a research NGO in Laos interviewed in 
September 2011, Sinohydro Corporation is in the process of adopting an environmental 
policy (interview 08092011) shows the continued importance of global standards for 
environmental protection in investment projects and an increasing interest of China’s 
companies to adhere to international policy frameworks (Bosshard 2010a,b).  
 
Indeed, normative processes have to be seen from a multi-level perspective. For Bui’s 
environmental norms, global governance frameworks, governments of emerging countries, 
recipient governments, and the companies involved in planning and executing 
infrastructure projects interact in a process of implementing norms enshrined in a number 
of documents, in the case of this study the Ghanaian law and World Bank Safeguard 
Policies.    
 
When evaluating the operation of Chinese companies, it is therefore necessary to consider 
the contractual arrangements under which a hydropower dam is constructed. Likewise, the 
domestic governance arrangement, the norms imposed by the host government, and the 
strictness of the monitoring system are factors that influence how China’s revenue-driven 
companies implement hydropower projects. Such factors also determine whether the 
project assists a country’s economic development. 
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